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Abstract 
 
In this paper we extend the behavioral macroeconomic model as proposed by De Grauwe 
(2012) to include a banking sector. The behavioral model takes the view that agents have 
limited cognitive limitations. As a result, it is rational to use simple forecasting rules and to 
subject the use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents then are driven to select the rule that 
performs best. The behavioral model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements of 
optimism and pessimism (animal spirits). Our main result is that the existence of banks 
intensifies these movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts. Thus banks do not 
create but amplify animal spirits. The policy conclusion we derive from this result is that the 
central bank has an important responsibility for stabilizing output. Output stabilization is an 
instrument to “tame the animal spirits”. This has the effect of improving the tradeoff between 
inflation and output volatility. 
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1  Introduction 
Since the start of the financial crisis DSGE modelers have hurriedly attempted to introduce a 
banking sector into their models. Unfortunately, this has been done in the framework of models 
that assume rational expectations, i.e. that assume that the representative agent understands the 
complexity of the underlying model. If there is anything we have learned from the financial 
crisis it is that this crisis was made possible by the fact that agents do not understand the 
complexity of the world in which they live. Instead, their cognitive abilities are very limited. 
Therefore there is a need to introduce a banking sector in models that recognize the cognitive 
limitations of agents. This is what we attempt to do in this paper.  
We will use the behavioral macroeconomic model that was proposed by De Grauwe (2012). 
This is a model that assumes that agents have cognitive limitations, and therefore use simple 
forecasting rules that do not take all information into account. Such an assumption is necessary 
once we take the view that agents are limited in their capacity to collect and process the 
immense information set that is present in the world. We introduce rationality in this model by 
allowing agents to learn from their mistakes and to switch to rules that perform better than the 
one they are currently using. In our opinion, this evolutionary rationality is a better way to 
describe rationality in a world that is too complex and uncertain for agents to understand.   
 
2  The model 
In this section we first present the basic behavioral macro model as proposed by De Grauwe 
(2012). We then go a step further by decomposing aggregate demand into consumption and 
investment demand. Finally banks are introduced. 
 
2.1 The baseline behavioral macro model (BMM) 
Our baseline behavioral macro model (BMM) consists of three equations, similarly to De 
Grauwe (2008b; 2008c; 2012).  
An aggregate demand (AD) function:  
 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎1𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑎1′ )𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,    (𝑎2 < 0) (1) 
 
aggregate supply (AS):  
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑏1𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑏1)𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑦𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 , (2) 
 
and a Taylor rule (TR):  
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡∗) + 𝑐2𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡. (3) 
 
As explained in De Grauwe (2008b; 2008c; 2012), there is no direct derivation of the model at 
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the micro level, albeit equations (1) to (3) are consistent with the linearized version of most New 
Keynesian models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007). 
The forecasts of 𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 and 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 in eq. (1) and (2) are governed by a fitness learning 
selection mechanism.2 
In this set up, agents are supposed to forecast the output gap (𝑦) and inflation (𝜋) using two 
alternative forecasting rules. In particular, for 𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 , agents are assumed to use the 
steady-state value of the output gap (fundamentalist rule) - 𝑦∗, here normalized to zero - against 
an extrapolation of the gap’s past trend (extrapolative rule).  
Analogously for inflation, agents are assumed to switch between a fundamentalist and an 
extrapolative rule. Further, in an environment where the central bank explicitly announces its 
inflation target, inflation fundamentalists are assumed to base their expectations on the central 
bank’s target, 𝜋∗. In contrast, inflation extrapolators behave exactly as output extrapolators do: 
by extrapolating inflation’s past trend into the future.  
Market forecasts of output gap and inflation are obtained as a weighted average of each 
respective forecasting rules (for 𝑖 = 𝑦,𝜋), as: 
 
 𝐸�𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑓,𝑡𝐸�𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑒,𝑡𝐸�𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡+1, (4) 
 
where the fundamentalist rule is generally defined as  
 𝐸�𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑖∗, 
and the extrapolative rule follows  
 𝐸�𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑖𝑡−1. 
We base our forecasting rule mechanism on a dynamic predictor selection, in line with discrete 
choice theory. This mechanism allows to switch between the two forecasting rules by computing 
the mean square forecasting error (MSFE)/utility of the two rules and increase (decrease) the 
relative weight of one rule against the other in each period. Under the formalization that the 
utilities of the two alternative rules have a deterministic and a random component - assuming 
the latter to be logistically distributed (see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992) - weights can 
be defined based on each period utility (𝑈.,𝑡, see also De Grauwe, 2012) as:  
 
 𝛼𝑓,𝑡𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡𝑖 )𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡𝑖 )+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡𝑖 ) 
and  
 1 − 𝛼𝑓,𝑡𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡𝑖 )𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡𝑖 )+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡𝑖 ), 
with (𝑖 = 𝑦,𝜋), and where 
2 For sake of brevity, we refrain to report the whole details, which are, anyway, provided in De Grauwe (2008b; 2008c; 2012). 
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 𝑈𝑓,𝑡𝑖 = −∑  ∞𝑘=0 𝑤𝑘�𝑖𝑡−𝑘−1 − 𝐸�𝑡−𝑘−2𝑓 𝑖𝑡−𝑘−1�2, 
and  
 𝑈𝑒,𝑡𝑖 = −∑  ∞𝑘=0 𝑤𝑘[𝑖𝑡−𝑘−1 − 𝐸�𝑡−𝑘−2𝑒 𝑖𝑡−𝑘−1]2 
 
where 𝑤𝑘 are geometrically declining weights, allowing to take into account the degree of 
forgetfulness in the model (see De Grauwe, 2012). 
Agents are thus “boundedly” rational in the sense that they use simple rules but subject these 
rules to a “fitness test” and switch depending on how well a given rule performs relative to the 
other rule. In this sense agents learn from their mistakes. 
 
2.2  Decomposing the aggregate demand 
The aggregate demand described previously can be decomposed into consumption (𝑐) and 
investment (𝑖) sides of the economy, plus an error component3 
 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 , (1') 
 
We specify the consumption and investment equations, respectively, as follows:  
 
 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑑1𝑦𝑡 + 𝑑2𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑑1 − 𝑑2)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑑3(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1),    (𝑑3 < 0) (5) 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒1𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝑒2(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1).    (𝑒2 < 0) (6) 
  
Consumption, 𝑐, depends on three factors. First, on current income - according to the parameter 
𝑑1 which represents the marginal propensity of consumption. Second, on expected future output 
gap, 𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1.  Third, consumption depends on past income, introducing an habit formation 
mechanism which is assumed to slow down the adjustment of consumption to its optimal level 
after a shock (see also De Grauwe, 2008b; 2008c; 2012; Smets and Wouters, 2007). Finally, 
consumption depends negatively on the real interest rate (𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1), for 𝑑3 < 0.  
Following a standard approach, investment depends first on a forward looking component, the 
expected future output gap, 𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 . Second, it negatively depends on the interest rate, 
according to the parameter 𝑒2 < 0, which measures the sensitivity of investment to changes in 
the real interest rate.  
Substituting (5) and (6) into (1’) and comparing with (1) allows us to derive the relationships 
between the parameters of equations (5) and (6) and equation (1), i.e.:  
𝑎1 = 𝑑2+𝑒11−𝑑1  , 𝑎1′ = 𝑑21−𝑑1 , 𝑎2 = 𝑑3+𝑒21−𝑑1   and 11−𝑑1 𝑣𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 where  0 < 𝑑1 < 1. 
3 For sake of tractability, the usual direct government expenditure term is ignored. 
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2.3  Introducing banks 
Banks are implicitly included in this model, since the interest rate is understood as the price of 
credit. However, in order to account for banks explicitly, we introduce financial intermediaries 
which are assumed to collect money from savers (consumers) and lend it to borrowers (firms).  
The balance sheet of commercial banks accounts for loan supply (𝐿𝑆), on the asset side, and 
deposits (𝐷), on the liability side. Bank equity (𝑛𝑏) serves as an important cushion against 
unexpected losses, being defined as the difference between assets and liabilities: 
 
 𝐿𝑡𝑆 = 𝑛𝑡𝑏 + 𝐷𝑡 . (7) 
 
For a commercial bank, the leverage is thus the ratio between its loans and equity. In this 
respect, banks are subject to an explicit capital-to-asset ratio, i.e.  
 
 𝑛𝑡
𝑏
𝐿𝑡
𝑆 = 𝜅, (8) 
 
with 𝜅 is the equity ratio  (the inverse of banks’ leverage ratio).  
When a firm borrows money from a bank, it must pay an interest which normally exceeds the 
interest rates that savers receive for deposits. Hence, the cost of a loan from banks, 𝜌, is usually 
equal to the rate savers receive (here equal to the risk-free rate set by the central bank, 𝑟) plus a 
spread, 𝑥.  
 𝜌𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡. (9) 
 
The investment demand in equation (6) is hence replaced with equation (6’), assuming 
investment to depend on the cost of bank loans, as:  
 
 𝑖 = 𝑖(𝜌) = 𝑒1𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝑒2(𝜌𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1).    (𝑒2 < 0) (6') 
 
In this way, the spread is assumed to affect the overall investment decisions of firms directly.  
Incorporating banks into the aggregate demand - by means of eq. (1'), (5), (9) and (6') - gives: 
 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎1𝐸�𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑎1′ )𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + (𝑎2 + 𝑎3)𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,    ((𝑎2 + 𝑎3) < 0) (1'') 
 
where 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are defined as before and 𝑎3 = −𝑑3/(1 − 𝑑1). This new aggregate demand 
function in (1'') subsitutes the one in (1) or (1’), where banks are absent. 
Comparisons of eq. (1) and (1'') suggest that - while the aggregate demand still depends on 
future expected and past income and (negatively) on the real interest rate - it also depends on the 
spread, 𝑥𝑡 . 
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Since the slope coefficient (𝑎2 + 𝑎3) is negative for 0 < 𝑑1 < 1 and 𝑒2 < 0, i.e. 𝑎2 + 𝑎3 =
𝑒2
1−𝑑1
, this new aggregate demand represents a negative relationship between 𝑦 and 𝑥.  
Looking at recent credit and money market developments there is a straightforward 
interpretation for this relationship.  
Bank lending further implies (stocks of) consumers’ savings to flow into deposits according to:  
 
 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑡. (10) 
 
In the same vein, loan demand (𝐿𝐷) and investment are related by:  
 
 𝐿𝑡𝐷 − 𝐿𝑡−1𝐷 = 𝑖𝑡, (11) 
 
Thus we assume that savings take the form of an accumulation of bank deposits, and 
investments by firms are financied by bank loans only.  
s is finally being determined as: 
 
  𝑠𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡,  (12) 
  
 
as in the standard IS-LM set up. 
The next step in the analysis is to determine what the spread between the borrowing and the 
deposit rate is. We use the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999) to do so. Defining 𝑛𝑓 as firms’ equity, we write: 
   
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑𝑛𝑡𝑓 ,    (𝜑 < 0) (13) 
 
Thus, an increase in the firms’ equity reduces the spread and viceversa.4 The underlying 
financial accelerator theory is the following. Banks have imperfect knowledge of the credit risk 
they take when granting a loan to a firm. To cover this credit risk they charge a spread (𝑥𝑡). 
When the value of equity of the firm increases this is interpreted by the bank as an improvement 
in the solvency of the firm. Thus banks will perceive the credit risk to have declined allowing 
them to reduce the spread. A decline in the value of the firms equity has the opposite effect. 
Such a decline is interprted as reducing the solvency of the firm and increasing the credit risk. 
Banks react by raising the spread.  
A firm with more debt than equity is leveraged. We define the leverage ratio, 𝜏 , as  
4 A further extension could be assuming the spread to depend on banks equity as well, in the vein of Gerali et al. (2010). When banks’ equity 
decreases the leverage for a bank would increase and financing new investment opportunities would become riskier. The natural reaction will be 
for a bank to reduce its assets and stop lending, thus increasing the spread. 
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 𝜏 = 𝐿𝑡𝐷
𝑛𝑡
𝑓 (14) 
To keep the model simple, it will be assumed here that firms keep the leverage ratio constant. 
According to (14) this implies that as the loan demand increases the firm will issue more equity 
in the same proportion (in Section 6 we will make the leverage ratio endogenous).  
By putting together eq. (11) and (14), one realizes that the equity of firms depends on the 
inverse of firms’ leverage ratio (𝜏), which is the equity ratio, as  
 
 𝑛𝑓𝑡 = 1𝜏 (𝐿𝑡−1𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡);   
 
e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
The spread clears the lending market determining the total level of loanable funds to firms. 
Here, loan demand (𝐿𝐷) is a function of investment, 𝐿𝑡𝐷 = 𝐿𝐷(𝑖). Via eq. (7) loan supply (𝐿𝑆) is 
a function of banks’ equity and deposits, i.e. 𝐿𝑡𝑆 = 𝐿𝑆(𝑛𝑏 ,𝐷), where bank equity is simply the 
difference between loans and deposits (subject to the contraint in eq. (8)). Via banks’ balance 
sheet the market is cleared for 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐿𝐷.  
 
3  Solving the model 
We obtain a model with five endogenous variables, output gap, inflation, spread, savings and 
interest rate. The first four are obtained after solving the following set of equations: 
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In compact form, this is written as 𝐀𝐙𝐭 = 𝐁𝐄�𝐭𝐙𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐂𝐙𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐃𝐗𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐄𝐯𝐭. As in De Grauwe 
(2008b; 2008c; 2012), a solution for 𝐙𝐭 is obtained as 𝐙𝐭 = 𝐀−𝟏(𝐁𝐄�𝐭𝐙𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐂𝐙𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐃𝐗𝐭−𝟏 +
𝐄𝐯𝐭) for 𝐀 being non-singular.  
We then obtain the value of the interest rate recursively by substituting output gap and inflation 
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into the Taylor rule. Investments, equities and deposits are determined by the model solutions 
for inflation, output, the spread and savings.5 
 
4  Calibration 
For the aggregate demand (AD) function we calibrate the parameters (𝑑1,𝑑2, 𝑒1) to match 
standard macroeconomic simulation results, broadly consistent with De Grauwe (2012). In 
particular, 𝑑1 is computed to match a marginal propensity to consume out of income equal to 
0.5, in line with the empirical literature pointing to a MPC in the range of 0.2~0.7.  
The remaining parameters are derived consistent with sign restrictions posited, namely a firms’ 
leverage factor of 𝜏 = 1.43, following Pesaran and Xu (2013) and 𝜑 < 0.  
   
Figure  1: US LIBOR-FFR spread (end-of-month) 
 
 Spread computed as in Taylor and Williams (2009)   
 
Table  1: US LIBOR-FFR spread (end-of-month) 
  Average Max  Min 
2004:1 - 2007:7  0.28 0.59 0.08 
2007:8 - 2009:3  0.29 4.88 -1.40 
2009:4 - 2013:3  0.05 0.12 -0.01 
 
For the latter, corresponding estimates are not available with precision in the literature.6 Thus, 
we calibrate 𝜑 for the spread to display the desirable propery of being alsways positive, 
consistent with the historical average of the LIBOR vs. Federal Fund Rate spread before August 
5 As in De Grauwe (2008b; 2008c; 2012), focusing on detrended variables - i.e. the output gap is GDP minus capacity GDP - implies that all our 
new variables will not show a trend either. 
6 For a discussion on steady state estimates for the spread see also Mehra, Piguillem and Prescott (2008), Curdia and Woodford (2010). 
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2007 (see Figure and Table 1).7 Banks’ equity ratio (the inverse of the leverage ratio, 𝑘) is 
further set equal to 0.09, as in Gerali et al. (2010), being consistent with much of the recent 
regulatory capital requirements for commercial banks.8  
 
5  Results 
5.1  Animal spirits drive the business cycles 
Figures 2 and 3 show the time pattern of output gap and animal spirits produced by the baseline 
model with banks in a typical simulation run. We observe a strong cyclical movement in the 
output gap (Figure 2). The source of these cyclical movements is seen to be the index of animal 
spirits in the market (Figure 3).  
We define animal spirits as the fraction of agents who forecast a positive output gap. When this 
is 1 all agents forecast such a positive output gap. They are all optimistic. When the index is 
zero all agents forecast a negative output gap; they are all pessimistic. The model creates 
endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. These are highly correlated with movements in 
the output gap (0.91) (see also De Grauwe, 2008b; 2008c; 2012). During some periods, 
pessimism dominates and this translates into below average output growth. These pessimistic 
periods are followed by optimistic periods when optimistic forecasts tend to dominate, with 
above average growth. 
 
Figure 2
 
Figure 3 
 
 
In Figure 4 we present the frequency distribution of the output gap. It turns out that this 
distribution is not normal. It has fat tails. Note that the stochastic shocks in the model are all 
i.i.d. Thus the non-normality of the distribution of the output gap is generated by the model, and 
7 Similar pictures are provided when considering the spread between other interest rates at which different classes of borrowers are able to fund 
their activities (e.g., LIBOR vs. overnight index swap rates; see Taylor and Williams, 2009). Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) refer to the 
prime lending vs. six-month Treasury bill rate. Our specification, however, takes into account the fact that the prime lending rate is no longer 
used as actual interest rate, being rather regarded as an index for calculating rate changes to adjustable-rate mortgages and other variable short 
term loans. 
8 There is consensus that that a 9% equity-to-assets ratio (inverse leverage), corresponding to 18% equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio would 
offer banks enough capacity to absorb asset related shocks. 
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does not come from outside. This contrasts with standard linear DSGE models that can only 
produce non-normal movements in output by non-normally distribute shocks. The mechanism in 
the model that produces the non-normality is the interaction between animal spirits and output. 
As more and more agents become, say, optimists, output gap changes accelerate, producing 
large changes. The same happens when the downturn sets in.  
We obtain more insight in this mechanism by plotting the frequency distribution of animal 
spirits in Figure 5. The latter is just a representation of the same animal spirits of Figure 3, but in 
the frequency domain. We observe that there is a concentration of observations at the extreme 
values of +1 (everybody is optimist) and 0 (everybody is pessimist). Thus the dynamics of 
animal spirits is characterized by movements in optimism (pessimism) that reguarly lead to 
outcomes when everybody is optimist (pessimist). This leads to “market frenzy” and large 
movements in economic activity. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the spread in the time domain. The spread is negatively 
correlated with animal spirits (-0.087). The reason is that during an upturn of economic activity 
when agents are optimistic, the value of equity of firms increases, leading banks to lower the 
spread. The opposite occurs during a downturn. The correlation coefficient is low, however, 
suggesting that this effect is weak. The relatively low correlation coefficient has much to do 
with the fact that the banks cannot easily expand their balance having to obey the balance sheet 
contraint in eq. (7), subject to an explicit (inverse of) banks’ leverage ratio, as set in eq. (8).  
To study the implications of changing regulatory capital requirements, we further vary the 
equity ratio 𝑘 (or, the inverse of banks’ leverage ratio) in the interval [0.01,0.9] and simulate 
the model over the spectrum of different 𝑘s. By changing 𝑘 to values closer to 0.9 (which is 
ten times the 9% capital requirement normally used) we force banks’ leverage to be smaller and 
smaller. From Figure 7 we observe that as banks increase their equity ratio the correlation 
between animal spirits and output gap declines dramattically. This suggests that the equity ratio 
could be used as a policy intrument: by raising the equity ratio of banks the authorities can 
singificantly reduce the scope for animals spirits to lead to boom and busts in economic activity. 
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 Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
In a later section we discuss ways to make the banks’ balance sheets react to the state of the 
economy. 
 
5.2  Effects of monetary policy shocks 
In this section we analyse the impulse responses following an unanticipated increase in the 
interest rate. We show these in Figures 8 to 11. The monetary policy shock occurs in period 100. 
We obtain the traditional results, i.e. output, investment and inflation decline. The results also 
confirm the pro-cyclicality of the spread. The interest rate induced decline in output and 
investment has the effect of reducing equity of firms. As a result, their creditworthiness 
declines. This then induces banks to raise the spread. Thus this effect is pro-cyclical, i.e. it tends 
to enhance the downturn initiated by the central bank’s increase in its interest rate.  
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 6  Leverage and stock prices 
6.1 The extended bank model 
In our previous set up we discussed the balance sheet constraint implied banks could not lend 
much more than they borrowed from households. As discussed in earlier, banks had no 
alternatives other than over reduce credit availability during a boom, and viceversa. This pretty 
much fixed the banks’ balance sheets. In practice, however, there exist mechanisms that can 
lead banks to expand their balance sheets duing booms and contract them during recessions, 
thereby amplifying business cycle movements. In this section we analyze one such mechanism. 
It will be based on the link between the firms’ asset values and the banks’ balance sheets. This 
can be called the "risk taking channel" . This exists when incentives for both banks and firms to 
bear risk related to the provision of loans are affected. Essentially, a boost in asset and collateral 
values (together with the belief that the increase in asset values is sustainable; ECB, 2011; 
Mankiw and Ball, 2010) may lead both borrowers and firms to accept higher risk, resulting into 
an excessive loan provision. This mechanism may easily come into play if admitting banks to 
Figure  8  Figure  9  
  
Figure  10  Figure  11  
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hold risky assets on their balance sheets, e.g. firms’ shares, and following a positive reevaluation 
of the profitability of these assets.  
In order to have asset price variability to contribute to the volatility in firms’ equity, we resort 
on the idea that firms’ market capitalization is equal to the number of (time-varying) shares (𝑛�𝑡) 
multiplied by the current share price (𝑆𝑡), i.e  
 
 𝑛𝑡
𝑓,𝑚 = 𝑛�𝑡𝑆𝑡. (15) 
 
 To derive share prices, we use the standard Gordon discounted dividend model,9.  
 
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡Λ�𝑡+1𝑅𝑡𝑆 , (16) 
 with  
 
 𝑅𝑡𝑆 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜉, (17) 
 
linking the asset price 𝑆𝑡 to expected future dividends (𝐸𝑡Λ�𝑡+1) net of a discount rate 𝑅𝑡. The 
latter consists of the risk-free interest rate plus a constant equity premium (𝜉). We calibrate 𝜉 
to be 5%, which is in line with the historical average market risk premium.  
The standard stable growth (Gordon) model assumes that dividends grow at a constant rate. The 
forecasts made by agents about future dividends follows the logic of the forecasts they make for 
the output gap. Agents assume the 1-period ahead forecast of dividends to be a fraction 𝛼 of 
nominal GDP one period ahead, whereas dividends are assumed to be constant thereafter (from 
𝑡 + 1 onwards). This forecast is reevaluated in every period. Since nominal GDP consists of a 
real and an inflation component, agents make a forecast of future output gap and inflation, in the 
same way as analyzed in Section 2. Thus, the forecasts are reevaluated each period, and agents 
are willing to switch to another forecasting rule if this performs better than the one they 
currently use. 
As before (equation 13) we assume that the spread is determined by the value of the firms’ 
equity. We substitute (15) into (13) and obtain   
 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜑𝑛�𝑡𝑆𝑡,    (𝜑 < 0) (13') 
 
As a result, share prices, by affecting the firms’ financial positions, influence the spread. 
Given these additional dynamics in 𝑆, firms’ leverage in eq. (14) is no longer exogenous. It is 
by the new equation (14’) 
9 See e.g., Brealy and Myers (1984). 
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  𝜏𝑡 = 𝐿𝑡𝐷𝑛�𝑡𝑆𝑡 (14') 
 
Finally, the banks balance sheet is modified in a way that allows for asset prices to feed back on 
banks’ balance sheet. In particular, it is assumed that banks own a fixed fraction, 𝑛��, of firms’ 
shares. 
  
 Tot. Assets (𝐴)  Liabilities (𝐵) 
Loans (𝐿𝑆)   Deposits (𝐷)  
Risky assets (𝑛��𝑆)  Own equity (𝑛𝑏)  
 
In this way, the sum of total assets, 𝐴𝑡, to be considered in banks’ balance sheet identity is 
simply: 
 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐿𝑡𝑆 + 𝑛��𝑆𝑡, (18) 
 As a result, the new balance sheet constraint of the banks is given by the following, 
  
 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑛𝑡𝑏 + 𝐷𝑡, (7') 
 
substituting equation (7). 
The link between asset prices and the banks’ balance sheets can now be described as follows. 
An increase in asset prices increases available collateral, leading to a decrease in leverage on the 
part of the borrowers, and granting potential access to credit. Financial intermediaries, in turn, 
see the value of their assets increase and will then have incentives to expand lending. This then 
tends to bring down the spread. Thus, asset prices affect the aggregate demand indirectly via 
credit spread dynamics and do not have wealth effects directly as in De Grauwe (2008a; 2012, 
Chapter 7).  
  
6.2 Results with the extended banking model 
We simulated the extended model using the same calibration as in the simple model. The results 
of the simualtions are shown in the Figures 12 to 16 below.  
A comparison with the simulations obtained with the simple model of Section 2 leads to a 
number of interesting insights. First, in the extended model with endogenous asset prices we 
obtain longer waves of optimism and pessimism leading to larger movements in the output gap, 
compared to the model without endogenous asset prices. This can be seen from the time series 
results of the output gap and animal spirits in Fig. 12 and 13 compared to Fig. 2, (note the 
different scales in Fig. 12). The frequency distribution of the output gap exhibits fatter tails in 
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the banking model with asset price. Analogously, animal spirits and their frequency distribution 
(Figure 14 and 15) display more concentration of observations in the extremes of optimism and 
pessimism in the new model with endogenous asset prices.  
    
Figure  12
 
Figure  13
 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
 
 
Further, in the extended model the spread dynamics as shown in Fig. 16 seems to more closely 
match the pattern observed on the US money market between August 2007 and March 2009 (see 
Fig. 1). Hence, a "risk taking channel", resulting into a larger loan provision, do exist and seem 
to be well capured by the model. 
Consistently, the spread correlation with respect to the economic cycle increases (in absolute 
value) up to 0.17. This suggests that bullish (bearish) periods affect the relationship between 
animal spirits and the spread, consistent with a “risk taking channel” hypothesis. However, this 
relationship remains itself feeble.10  
10 The fact that correlation does not increase by much is also explained by the fact that the spread is driven by stock prices, being themselves a 
function of real expected output growth. In particular, the expected inflation component in eq. (15) is negatively correlated both with expected 
nominal output growth (-0.51) and with animal spirits (-0.44) for the model with stock prices. The results are not qualitatively different for the 
model without stock prices, i.e. -0.62 and -0.47, respectively.       
 15 
                                                     
Figure 16 
 
7.  Monetary Policy implications 
The existence of endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) has 
important implications for monetary policy. The way we analyze these implications is by 
constructing tradeoffs between output and inflation variability. In standard DSGE-models these 
trradeoffs are always downward sloping. This means that in these models, any attempt to reduce 
output volatility by the use of the interest rate instrument comes at a price, i.e. more inflation 
volatility. Put differently, if the monetary authorities decide to increase their ambition to 
stabilize output fluctuations, they may be succesful in reducing output volatility, but this will be 
achieved by increasing inflation volatility.  
In our behavioral model we obtain a different result. In order to show this we construct the 
tradeoffs between output and inflation volatility usng the behavioral model with the simple 
banking sector. We do this by varying the output coefficient in the Taylor rule equation, 𝑐2, 
from 0 to 1 (keeping the inflation coefficient constant). For each value of 𝑐2 we simulate the 
model and compute the standard deviations of output and inflation. We plot these numbers in 
figure with standard deviation of inflation on the vertical axis and the standard deviation of 
output on the horizontal axis (see Figure 17). We repeat this exercise for different inflation 
coefficients, so that we obtain one trade-off for every fixed inflation coefficient.  
The striking aspect of our results is that the tradeoffs we obtain are non-linear in nature. In order 
to understand the nature of this on-linear trade-off we start from point A on the tradeoff obtained 
when 𝑐1 = 1. Point A corresponds to the situation where the central bank sets 𝑐2 = 0, i.e. it 
does not attempt to stabilize output at all. If the central bank then starts increasing c2, we go 
down the tradeoff. This means that for a given 𝑐1 increasing the output stabilization parameter 
reduces both output volatility (not surprising) and inflation volatility (surprising). Where does 
this effect come from? The answer is that by stabilizing output, the central bank helps in 
stabilizing animal spirits (waves of optimism and pessimism). The latter is a source of volatility 
not only of output but also of inflation. By “taming the animal spirits” the central banks reduces 
both inflation and output volatility. It follows that strict inflation targeting can never be optimal. 
There are limits to this “win-win” situation. The central bank can overdo its output stabilization 
effort. This is achieved whereh the tradeoff reaches the minimum point and becomes a 
negatively sloped line. We reach this point because too much output stabilization undermines 
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the credibiliyt of the inflation target.  
 
Inflation targeting remains important. We observe from Figure that with increasing c1’s the 
tradeoffs move downwards. This means that as the central banks follows a tighter inflation 
targeting policy rule, the tradeoffs improve. They remain non-linear, though; which means that 
even in tighter inflation targetin regimes is pays to stabilize output. 
 
Figure 17 
 
  
8  Spread dynamics and monetary policy 
In this Section we assume the central bank may attempt to stabilize the spread directly - 
quantitative (or, credit) easing - for instance, by buying loans directly from commercial banks. 
In our set up, the spread between the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the interest 
rate at which firms can borrow have little dampening effect on the real economy (via investment 
and output). However, this effect is likely to be amplified when stock prices are included (see 
Section 6.2). 
Over the most recent cycle in the US, this pattern has become particularly clear. In fact, rising 
credit risks (following assets’ re-evaluations) have pushed credit spreads to unprecedented 
levels, taking a "heavy toll on business and consumer confidence" (Bernanke, 2009). In the 
previous section we showed, in fact, that the model mimics well this behaviour of the spread 
over the recent US cycle (Figure 1), when share prices are included. The effect on the real 
activity is likely to be magnified, as it results from the analysis of correlograms of both output 
and animal spirits. However, concurrence between the spread and animal spirits remains small, 
and similarly so for the model without stock prices.   
While, at this stage, it is not clear whether spread dynamics may warrant a monetary policy 
reaction, the US experience (together with our exercise in section 6.2) certainly questions the 
conventional wisdom that the relation between the short-term risk-free interest rate - controlled 
A 
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by the central bank - and the interest rate at which firms can borrow is by itself stable (McCulley 
and Toloui, 2008).  
The policy question that arises here is whether the central bank can exploit the effect of the 
spread on economic actitiy and introduce it in its monetary policy reaction. Curdia and 
Woodford (2008) have suggested that the Fed should do so and should target the spread so as to 
minimize deviations of expected inflation and output from their benchmark levels..  
Therefore we allow the central bank to react to changes in the spread via a modified Taylor rule 
function, as:  
 
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡∗) + 𝑐2𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑐4𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 , (3') 
 
where 𝑐4  is the policy parameter the central bank uses in reacting to the spread. An 
investigation of this policy rule corresponds to the proposal of authors such as Curdia and 
Woodford (2008), McCulley and Toloui (2008), Taylor (2008). However, differently from the 
latter two, and following the former, we do not limit our analysis to the case of 𝑐4 = 1. Instead, 
we consider the possibility of policy adjustment being less than the size of the increase in the 
credit spread. For those reasons, we choose an interest rate spread reaction parameter to be in 
the range of 0 ≤ 𝑐4 ≤ −1. As discussed in the relevant literature, the reaction parameter must 
be negative, as an increase in the interest rate spread implies a credit crunch, requiring monetary 
policy alleviation.  
As in the previous section we construct tradeoffs that show how the variability of inflation and 
output are affected by the stablization of the spread. Put differently, we ask whether targeting 
the spread enhances the central bank’s capacity of stabilizing output and inflation.  
    
Figure  18 Figure  19 
  
 
For each value in the parameter space of 𝑐4 we simulated the model over 1000 periods and 
computed the standard deviations of output, inflation and the spread. The exercise is then 
repeated 100 times and the mean standard deviations obtained for each value of 𝑐4  are 
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computed. The results are presented in Figures 18 (output variability) and 19 (inflation 
variability). We find that there is no relation between 𝑐4 and the standard deviations of output  
and inflation. This implies that targeting the spread does not allow the central bank to reduce the 
volatiliyt of output or inflation.  
These results are consistent with the finding that the spread displays little correlation with 
animal spirits. Thus, targeting the spread does not do much in “taming the animal spirits”. This 
contrasts a great deal with the results obtained in the previous section, showing that the direct 
stabilisation of output has the property of stabilizing the animal spirits and in so doing 
stabilizing output. 
 
8  Conclusion 
In this paper we have extended the behavioral macroeconomic model as proposed by De 
Grauwe (2012) to include a banking sector. The behavioral model takes the view that agents 
have limited congitive limitations. As a result, it is rational to use simple forecasting rules and to 
subject the use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents then are driven to select the rule that 
performs best. We believe that this is the proper way to define rationality in a world were agents 
are baffled by the complexity of the world. It is also in this framework that the banking sector is 
introduced. 
Our behavioral model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements of optimism and 
pessimism (animal spirits). Our main result is that the existence of banks intensifies these 
movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts. Thus banks do not create but amplify 
animal spirits. The feature that is responsible for this amplification effect is the following. 
During booms, equity of firms increases in value. This is a signal for the banks that the credit 
risk of firms declines. As a result, they are willing to lower the interest rate spread they chargen 
on loans. The opposite occurs during a recession. This the spreads work procyclically and 
intensify the volatility of output.  
The policy conslusion we derive from this is that the central bank has an important 
responsibility for stabilising output. Output stabilization is an instrument to “tame the animal 
spirits”. This has the effect of improving the tradeoff between inflation and output volatility. We 
also found that the equity ratio of banks can be used as a policy instrument, i.e. by raising the 
equity ratio of banks, the amplification effect that is produced by the banking sector is reduced 
and and as a result the influence of animal spirits on economic activity is weakened, reducing  
the intensity of booms and busts in economic activity.     
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